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THE SERVANTSt 
Stephan Landsman* 
BARRISTERS' CLERKS, THE LAW'S MIDDLEMEN. By John Flood. 
Manchester, England: Manchester University Press. 1983. Pp. vii, 
164. $22. 
I. THE WORLD OF THE ENGLISH BAR 
Even before the advent of Rumpole of the Bailey, 1 it was common 
knowledge in America that England has a bifurcated legal profession 
comprised of bewigged courtroom advocates (barristers) and business-
suited clients' representatives (solicitors).2 Few Americans, however, 
have progressed far beyond this bright-line distinction. One of the 
great values of John Flood's book, Barristers' Clerks, The Law's Mid-
dlemen, is that in its brief span it affords the reader access to an impor-
tant corner of the world of English legal practice and thereby helps to 
elucidate the entire English system. 
In order to understand what barristers' clerks do it is necessary to 
understand a number of things about their masters. Barristers are spe-
cialists most of whose work is concerned with issues arising out of 
potential litigation. The process leading to admission to practice is 
both time-consuming and costly. First, candidates must be "called to 
the Bar." In order to be called each applicant must affiliate with one 
of the four Inns of Court. 3 Affiliation can only be achieved if the can-
t The author wishes to thank William Twining, Michael Zander, Myron Glazer, Lars 
Mosesson and Janice Toran for their assistance in the preparation of this review. 
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University. B.A. 
1969, Kenyon College; J.D. 1972, Harvard University. Professor Landsman's research on the 
history of the adversary system took him to London, where he completed this review. - Ed. 
1. Although John Mortimer was the creator of the rotund barrister-sleuth featured in 
RUMPOLE OF THE BAILEY (1980), THE TRIALS OF RUMPOLE (1981) and RUMPOLE'S RETURN 
(1982), it is the actor Leo McKern who, through his television portrayal, has come to personify 
for many Americans the archetypal English barrister. 
2. Solicitors are, however, permitted to appear and argue in "county courts, magistrates' 
courts, certain proceedings in the Crown Court, certain tribunals and • • • bankruptcy matters in 
the High Court." R. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 235 (5th ed. 1980) (footnotes 
omitted). 
3. The four Inns are Inner Temple, Middle Temple, Gray's Inn and Lincoln's Inn. The Inns 
were originally the living and dining quarters of medieval advocates. Over a number of centuries 
they evolved into societies charged by the judiciary with the responsibility of overseeing the 
training and conduct of barristers. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HlsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 414-
31 (1st ed. 1909); 4 w. HOLDSWORTH, supra (3d ed. 1924), at 263-72; 12 w. HOLDSWORTH, 
supra (6th ed. 1938), at 15-40; R. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JusncE IN ENGLAND 426-28 
(7th ed. 1977). Today they act collegially to regulate the members of the Bar through a Senate 
established in 1966. See R. WALKER, supra note 2, at 253. 
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didate satisfies a general educational requirement and undertakes pre-
liminary vocational training,4 "keeps term" by regularly dining at one 
of the Inns, 5 demonstrates good moral character, 6 avoids involvement 
in certain unacceptable occupations, 7 and pays the requisite fees. 8 
Once called to the Bar candidates must undertake an uncompen-
sated twelve-month apprenticeship (pupilage) with a senior barrister 
(pupil master).9 Upon successful completion of the pupilage a barris-
ter is eligible to practice. The new barrister can only do so, however, if 
accepted as a member of a set of chambers (usually described as ob-
taining a "tenancy" in that set). Chambers are somewhat similar to 
American law offices, 10 but their establishment and operation are rig-
idly controlled by the Inns of Court to insure the independence of each 
barrister. In London, where the vast majority of barristers practice, 11 
virtually all chambers are located within the confines of the four 
Inns.12 The number of places in chambers is severely circumscribed 
and more than one-half of those seeking a tenancy may not find one. 13 
Although barristers must join a set of chambers, each is considered a 
sole practitioner and is prohibited from entering into any partnership 
4. See R. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 437-42; M. ZANDER, LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE COM• 
MUNITY 176 (1978). 
5. Dining in one's Inn a certain number of times per term for twelve terms is part of the 
process of qualification. On application it can be done in the year of the vocational course 
and the year after Call. Dining costs in all between £2S and £40 depending on the Inn -
plus the cost of travel and overnight accommodation for those who come from out of 
London. 
M. ZANDER, supra note 4, at 377 n.32. 
6. Id. at 176. 
7. Prohibited professions include solicitor, patent agent and parliamentary agent as well as 
"any other occupation which in the opinion of the Masters of the Bench 'is incompatible with the 
position of a student seeking call to the Bar.' " Id. (quoting CoNSOLIDATED REGULATIONS OP 
THE HONOURABLE SOCIETIES OF LINCOLN'S INN, INNER TEMPLE, MIDDLE TEMPLE AND 
GRAY'S INN). 
8. For an English student from an English university, fees are likely to include: admission to 
the Inn (£82-85); tuition for vocational training (£320); bar examination (£20); and call to the 
Bar (£7S) (all figures as of 1976). Id. at 376-77. 
9. "Any barrister who has continuously practiced for five years may take on a pupil, The 
pupil reads his pupilmaster's papers, follows him to Court, and occasionally does some drafting 
for him.'' P. 12 n.10. 
10. Chambers are similar to traditional partnerships because there is a mutual fund of good-
will, a system for work and fee sharing, see note 40 infra and accompanying text, and a regular 
sharing of expenses. Hazell, Clerks and Fees, in THE BAR ON TRIAL 99, 124 (R. Hazell ed. 
1978). But see note 14 infra and accompanying text. 
11. See M. ZANDER, supra note 4, at 28 (In 1977 there were 3881 barristers in practice; of 
this number only 1127 (29%) practice wholly or in large measure outside London,), 
12. Today there is no requirement that all chambers be located in the four Inns of Court. See 
W. BoULTON, A GUIDE TO CoNDUCT AND ETIQUETI'E AT THE BAR OP ENGLAND AND WALES 
61 (5th ed. 1975). However, as late as 1965 barristers were being disbarred for practicing in 
London chambers located outside one of the four Inns. See B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, IN 
SEARCH OP JUSTICE 103 (1968). 
13. See Hazell, Introduction to the Bar, in THE BAR ON TRIAL, supra note 10, at 22. 
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arrangements.14 Each must develop and sustain his or her own 
practice. 
Regulations regarding legal practice tightly constrain the conduct 
of members of the Bar. Barristers are neither allowed to seek legal 
business, 15 nor to have unmediated contact with lay clients.16 Virtu-
ally all consultations and employment are initiated, arranged and 
overseen by solicitors. Traditionally, barristers have been expected to 
serve clients on a first-come-first-served basis (a principle referred to 
as the "cab-rank rule"). 17 Any solicitor is free, at least in theory, to 
avail his client of the services of any barrister. Once retained, the bar-
rister must rely on the solicitor to do virtually all the factual investiga-
tion required to prepare the case for trial. It is the solicitor's 
responsibility to interview witnesses and identify the evidentiary 
materials that will be presented in court. 18 In the usual case ending in 
a trial, the barrister's only functions are courtroom advocacy and steps 
taken in preparation for courtroom appearances. 
Barristers are prohibited from directly negotiating fees for their 
services.19 Compensation is generally fixed by an agreement between 
the solicitor and the barrister's clerk. For this reason, among others, it 
is required that each barrister have a clerk.20 Payments to barristers 
for work performed are classified as honoraria and cannot be recov-
ered by legal action. As a concomitant no contract is held to exist 
14. Despite the similarities of chambers to partnership arrangements, see note 10 supra, bar-
95ters are said to be forbidden to engage in any sort of practice "in the least degree resembling 
partnership." W. BOULTON, supra note 12, at 6. 
15. "Any form of advertising or touting by a barrister is contrary to professional etiquette." 
W. BOULTON, supra note 12, at 7 (footnote omitted). It should be noted that barristers' obliga-
tions "are governed solely by the pictates of professional etiquette." R. WALKER, supra note 2, 
at 258. 
16. "The general rule is that barristers do not see or advise clients or accept briefs or appear 
as advocates on behalf of clients without the intervention of a solicitor." W. BOULTON, supra 
note 12, at 8 (footnote omitted). This is a custom of rather recent origin, not recognized until the 
eighteenth century. See R. WALKER, supra note 2, at 235 n.3. 
17. "Counsel is bound to accept any brief in the Courts in which he professes to practise at a 
proper professional fee dependent on the length and difficulty of the case, but special circum-
stances may justify his refusal, at his discretion, to accept a particular brief." W. BOULTON, supra 
note 12, at 6 (footnote omitted). 
18. "It is recognised practice that witnesses (other than the parties and experts or profes-
sional witnesses who are instructing counsel), should not be present at consultations or confer-
ences with counsel and that counsel should not interview such witnesses before or during a trial." 
Id. at 12. See also R. MEGARRY, LAWYER AND LmGANT IN ENGLAND 46-48 (1962) (claiming 
that the purpose of this rule is to reduce the risk of witness tampering). 
19. "Brief fees are fixed by arrangment between the instructing solicitor or his clerk, and 
counsel's clerk, but it is permissible in cases of special difficulty for counsel to discuss the amount 
of a fee personally with the instructing solicitor." W. BOULTON, supra note 12, at 50 (footnote 
omitted). Traditionally barristers have had no desire to get involved in the fee fixing process. As 
Megarry states, "Fees are clerk's business, and counsel gratefully and trustingly leaves it to him." 
R. MEGARRY, supra note 18, at 60. 
20. See W. BOULTON, supra note 12, at 6. 
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between barristers and those who employ them.21 Barristers are im-
mune from actions for breach of contract and from malpractice claims 
related to services provided either at trial or in preparing a case for 
trial.22 
The barristers' clerk is the administrator employed by all the bar-
risters in a set of chambers to conduct the business of that chambers 
and of each affiliated barrister. The clerk is responsible for "negotiat-
ing his barristers' fees and collecting them, obtaining work for his bar-
risters, supervising their and the chambers' accounts, helping to 
schedule cases and checking the daily court lists for his barristers and 
the solicitors" (p. 3). The clerk is the intermediary who bridges the 
legally mandated gaps separating barrister from solicitor and client. 
He also manages the internal functioning of chambers. In this capac-
ity the clerk serves as intermediary between younger and older barris-
ters as well as the manager of each barrister's career. The clerk is the 
servant who relieves his masters of the day-to-day chores involved in 
making a living by practicing law. 
II. STUDYING BARRISTERS' CLERKS 
John Flood calls his work an "ethnographic" study of barristers' 
clerks (p. 134). By this he means a detailed description and analysis of 
"the culturally significant behaviors of a . . . small well-defined com-
munity" (p. 150 n.1). Such a study requires "prolonged face-to-face 
contacts with members of the local group, direct participation in some 
of the group's activities, and a greater emphasis on intensive work 
with informants than on the use of documentary or survey data" (p. 
150 n.1). In carrying out his study, Flood, then a graduate student in 
socio-legal studies at the School of Law of the University of Warwick, 
spent months among barristers' clerks. He lived their life, shared their 
work, and assumed their outlook. The product of these experiences is 
a book that succeeds in shedding light upon a previously unknown 
part of the legal world. 
Flood's study begins with an examination of clerks' career pat-
terns. Clerks most frequently begin their careers at school-leaving 
age,23 when they are hired into chambers as errand boys. Boys are 
selected and carefully supervised by the senior clerk in each set of 
chambers. The boys are predominantly "white British males" of 
working class background and are likely to share the sexual and ethnic 
21. See Ronde! v. W., [1966] 3 All E.R. 657, 661-64 (C.A. 1966) (Lord Denning, M.R., 
detailing history of rules prohibiting both suits for fees and contracts between barristers and 
clients), affd. sub nom. Ronde! v. Worsley, [1967] 3 All E.R. 993 (H.L. 1967); R. WALKER, supra 
note 2, at 255 (relation between barrister and client sui generis). 
22. See Ronde! v. W., [1966] 3 All E.R. at 661-62, 667. 
23. In an earlier era school-leaving age might have been 13 or 14. Today it is generally a bit 
older. P. 17. 
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prejudices that predominate among their seniors (p. 18). Virtually all 
a boy's training is of the practical variety and the boy who demon-
strates an aptitude for clerking will, within a couple of years, be pro-
moted to the position of junior clerk. He is likely to remain a junior 
clerk for an extended period (ten or more years is not uncommon) (p. 
23). A junior clerk usually receives a fixed salary and carries out most 
of the routine functions necessary to the operation of chambers. Even-
tually, successful juniors will make application for a senior clerk posi-
tion. Almost invariably application is made in a different set of 
chambers than those in which the applicant has previously worked. 
The senior clerk is in charge of all the administrative operations of 
chambers. He is generally paid on a commission basis, receiving up to 
ten percent of each of his barrister's fees. In a large chambers ( of 
which there are a great many today) the senior clerk is likely to earn a 
significantly higher salary than most of his junior barristers.24 
The clerk's career is remarkably insular. From a very early age 
boys are immersed in the world of the Inns of Court. They are super-
vised, counselled and judged exclusively by their senior colleagues. 
Not even barristers seem to have much direct influence on a clerk's 
training or behavior.25 Their allegiance is to their isolated fraternity. 
In this environment prejudices against outsiders and new ideas are 
likely to be accentuated (p. 18). 
According to Flood, clerks see themselves as the architects of their 
barristers' careers. New barristers often need clerks to find them 
work. Neophytes have little reputation to trade on and may get little 
business unless their clerks take matters in hand. Despite this depen-
dency, formal relations between barrister and clerk emphasize the bar-
rister's superior status. The clerk always addresses his barristers 
formally,26 while they address him by his Christian name (p. 39). 
Flood suggests that behind this facade the clerk holds real power over 
young barristers because he is responsible for the negotiation and col-
lection of all their fees. Moreover, it is the clerk who is charged with 
the responsibility of dealing with pupils and tenants who fail to secure 
the situations they seek. He eases the rejected pupil out of chambers 
and adjusts barrister expectations to match limited prospects. To 
Flood this suggests that the clerk is the puppet-master who controls 
his barristers. "By quietly manipulating unseen strings the clerk 
prompts and restrains his governors' behavior .... " (p. 55). 
Although Flood contends that the clerk may be of critical impor-
24. See M. ZANDER, THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFES-
SION 31 (1980) (quoting 1 FINAL REPORT OF THE ROYAL CoMMISSION ON LEGAL SERVICES 
487 (1979)). 
25. See, e.g., Hazell, supra note 10, at 113 (In 1974, the Bar Council refused to allow a pupil 
even to spend time observing the operation of a clerk's office.). 
26. Barristers are generally referred to as "Sir," "Mr. -," "Miss," "Miss-" or "Mrs. 
-." Pp. 39, 61 n.11. 
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tance to senior as well as junior barristers, most of the evidence sug-
gests that senior members of the Bar are free of clerk control.27 In 
essence, it is the young who are subjected to the clerk's domination. 
Flood thinks that this arrangment is perpetuated because it provides 
the Bar with an effective way of deterring rapid expansion and mini-
mizes the power of new barristers. The clerk serves as the " 'gate-
keeper' or filter" through which barristers are screened (p. 132). 
Clerks help assure that not too many young barristers pass through to 
threaten the positions or economic well-being of their senior brethren. 
The clerk is also useful because his prejudices ( especially against wo-
men and ethnic minorities) mirror the unarticulated biases of the Bar 
and can be relied upon to help exclude outsiders from the club (p. 
132). Flood concludes, "The Bar maintains clean hands while the 
clerks do its dirty work" (p. 133). 
Flood provides a detailed analysis of the sources of barristers' busi-
ness and the clerks' role in business getting. Because barristers are pro-
hibited by ethical constraints from seeking work directly it is up to the 
clerks to make the arrangements that keep barristers busy. Clerks do 
this by maintaining contact with those solicitors, solicitors' clerks and 
government officials28 who have legal work to distribute. Within lim-
its clerks are expected to tout all these potential sources of business. 
The clerks' goal is to establish ongoing relationships that will ensure a 
steady flow of cases into chambers. Solicitors are to be kept as happy 
as possible. Clerks must carefully attend to each solicitor's interests 
and even go so far as to defend solicitors against their barristers when 
the latter insist on the collection of outstanding fees (p. 74). In the 
clerks' world the most important thing is the steady flow of business. 
Therefore, clerks seldom attempt to inflate individual fees, struggling 
instead to maintain fees at a level that will guarantee continued cus-
tom (p. 76). 
27. See text following note 39 infra. The one important exception to this proposition is that 
barristers often rely on advice from their clerks in deciding whether to seek elevation to the 
special position of Queen's Counsel (Q.C.): 
Originally Queen's Counsel were appointed for the work of the Crown, but by the end of the 
eighteenth century it became a regular practice for successful men to apply for the appoint-
ment. The appointment is made by the Lord Chancellor; there are no qualifications, but it is 
understood that at least ten years' standing is required, together with an indefinable degree 
of success as a junior. The purpose of becoming a Queen's Counsel has for long had nothing 
to do with Crown work; the old rule that he must not appear against the Crown now means 
that leave to do so must be obtained, as when he appears for the defence in a criminal case, 
but the leave is given automatically. A number of conventions give Queen's Counsel the 
position of a superior grade of barrister. 
R. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 429. Special advice may be needed because the kinds of work Q.C.s 
can perform are limited and, therefore, practical judgments about business prospects are a neces-
sary part of the decision-making process. 
28. ''The Bar's remuneration survey conducted for the Royal Commission showed that bar-
risters earn 43 per cent of their income from public funds (16 per cent for prosecution work, 19 
per cent from criminal legal aid and 8 percent from civil legal aid) ••• ," M. ZANDER, supra 
note 4, at 37. For a somewhat more detailed description of the kinds of work done, see B. ADEL· 
SMITH & R. STEVENS, supra note 12, at 112-14. 
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Once a flow of work has been assured, clerks are likely to attempt 
to upgrade the quality of cases taken. This is done by declining minor 
cases and by favoring matters brought in by "better-quality firms" of 
solicitors (p. 70). Notwithstanding the cab-rank rule, clerks pick and 
choose among the cases offered their barristers. By asking excessive 
fees or emphasizing the likelihood of long delays clerks are able to 
control the flow of business. According to Flood, the clerks' approach 
to business selection has rendered the cab-rank rule "substantially a 
myth" (p. 80). 
Each clerk's objective is to have all his barristers fully occupied. 
To achieve this end the clerk books as much work as possible for each 
barrister. Because of the vagaries inherent in legal practice and judi-
cial scheduling there is frequent overbooking.29 When a barrister is 
overbooked some of his work must be returned to the solicitors who 
engaged him and new counsel must be found to handle the returned 
brief. Most often briefs are returned at the last moment, permitting 
the new barrister very little time to prepare. In these circumstances 
the quality of representation is bound to suffer. "The frenetic pace of 
activity [resulting in the return or reassignment of briefs] ... creates 
a 'battery farm' atmosphere which tends to dehumanise the clients' 
cases" (p. 72). 
Ill. STRENGTHS AND SHORTCOMINGS 
Perhaps the greatest strength of Barristers' Clerks is its wealth of 
detailed information about the clerks' milieu. Flood's first-hand ob-
servations and anecdotal illustrations bring the world of the Inns of 
Court to life. We are shown the real stuff of the clerks' job and from it 
can construct a clearer picture of legal practice in England. Flood's 
intimate contact with the clerks has led him to adopt a sympathetic 
view of their ways. His friendly attitude is of great value as a counter-
balance to the generally negative attitudes adopted by a number of 
other modern commentators. 30 He is especially effective in refuting 
the critics' charge that clerks inflate legal fees in individual cases as a 
means of augmenting their income.31 In this instance, and throughout 
the book, Flood places the clerks in the context of a system broader 
than the single case and intelligently assesses the pressures that lead 
them to act as they do. 
Flood's work also helps dispel a number of myths about the ·Eng-
lish Bar. For example, he carefully scrutinizes the claim that barris-
29. See Hazell, supra note 10, at 120. 
30. For commentary critical of barristers' clerks, see B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, supra 
note 12, at 288; M. ZANDER, LA WYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 83-95 (1968); Hazell, supra 
note 10, at 105-24. 
31. See text following note 28 supra. Such charges are made in all the sources cited at note 
30 supra. 
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ters abide by the cab-rank rule and demonstrates that the Bar does not 
work on a first-come-first-served basis. Dissolving such myths helps 
open the way to a more accurate assessment of the legitimacy of bar-
rister claims to a variety of special advantages, including immunity 
from liability for malpractice and exclusivity of audience in the high 
courts.32 
Flood also deserves praise for the candor with which he describes 
his research methods and experience. 33 In a long appendix entitled 
"Biography of a Research Project," Flood provides a detailed descrip-
tion of his work. His exacting description of his feelings and tech-
niques make it possible for the reader to identify both the advantages 
and drawbacks of his warm relations with the clerks. 34 
The strengths of Flood's book - its mass of detail, wealth of anec-
dotal material and empathy with its subjects - also give rise to a 
number of serious weaknesses. Concentration on detail and anecdote 
keeps Flood from providing the "systematic study" he says is needed 
(p. 1). A preoccupation with the present inhibits Flood from carefully 
examining the historical context in which the clerk system developed. 
Without an historical framework Flood is hard-pressed to compre-
hend all the implications of what he sees. 
Although historians have seldom directly addressed the question 
of the development of barristers' clerks35 there is, in historical works 
concerning the Bar, an abundance of information bearing upon the 
question. A single example should suffice to demonstrate the utility of 
such historical data. Raymond Cocks, in his recent examination of 
the development of the Bar36 suggests that during the nineteenth cen-
tury there was a dramatic shift in the way legal business was con-
ducted in England.37 At the start of the 1800's, barristers generally 
practiced alone or with a small group of friends. Virtually every bar-
rister had his own clerk and office. By the end of the century barris-
ters no longer practiced in this way but had organized themselves into 
32. Flood notes that the Bar has generally relied on the cab-rank rule to justify its right to 
exclusive audience. P. 80. Lord Denning appears to rely on the same principle to justify barris-
ters' immunity from malpractice claims. See Ronde! v. W., [1966] 3 All E.R. 657, 665 (C.A, 
1966), affd. sub nom. Ronde! v. Worsley, [1967] 3 All E.R. 993 (H.L. 1967). 
33. I am grateful to Professor Myron Glazer for bringing this point to my attention. For a 
sensitive analysis of the interpersonal problems posed by field research, see M. GLAZER, THE 
REsEARCH ADVENTURE (1972). 
34. An expanded description of Flood's research methodology appears in Flood, Researching 
Barrister's [sic] Clerks, in LAW AND SOCIAL ENQUIRY: CASE SnJDJES OF REsEARCH 158 (R, 
Luckham ed. 1981). 
35. Flood demonstrates the difficulty of finding sources that directly examine the history of 
barristers' clerks. Even Holdsworth's encyclopedic A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW does not seem 
to address the question. P. 14 n.26. But see note 36 infra and accompanying text. 
36. R. COCKS, FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN BAR (1983). The following discussion of 
historical material is drawn from Cocks's work. 
37. Id. at 9-10. 
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chambers run by senior barristers and managed by a single clerk. The 
suggestion Cocks makes about this change is that it reflects the grow-
ing desire of Victorian barristers to ensure the stability of the Bar 
against any unsettling influence that might be exerted by younger bar-
risters (who were then coming into the profession in large numbers).38 
Chambers appear, at least in part, to represent the imposition of a 
hierarchical mechanism to curb junior barristers and assure the con-
tinuing power of their elders. This historical information provides a 
valuable context in which to view the present relations between clerks 
and young barristers. Although Flood recognizes that clerks are used 
to "filter" and control young barristers he fails to understand the 
broader context in which this is taking place. Flood's narrowness of 
vision leads him to ascribe too much power and importance to the 
clerks when, in reality, they are the pawns of a Bar dedicated through-
out much of its recent history to the perpetuation of the power of its 
senior members. 
Flood's empathy with the clerks helps him understand and explain 
much of their behavior. However, this warmth of feeling clouds his 
judgment on a number of issues. Flood accepts as true certain of the 
myths clerks have propagated about themselves. Perhaps most unfor-
tunate is his acceptance of the clerks' view that they are puppet-mas-
ters who manipulate their barristers' lives.39 Flood's own evidence 
suggests the limited value of this image. Senior barristers are generally 
free of their clerks' control. They can and do refuse to handle matters 
scheduled for them by their clerks (p. 43), dispute fees fixed by their 
clerks (pp. 43-44) and delay payment of commissions owed to their 
clerks (p. 51). Senior members of the Bar have also acted collegially in 
derogation of the clerks' interests, as in the period 1969-1970, when 
the separate clerk's fee was abolished and the groundwork laid for re-
ducing the size of commissions (pp. 124-26). 
It is the young barrister, then, over whom the clerk exerts the 
greatest power. Even in this setting, however, the clerk's power is sub-
ject to a variety of limits. Unfortunately, Flood does not adequately 
consider these limits. For example, much of a barrister's early work is 
directed to him by senior members of chambers without the mediation 
of the clerk. Often senior barristers will have their young colleagues 
prepare cases or write opinions for them. This subcontracting proce-
dure is called "devilling" and accounts for a not insignificant part of a 
young barrister's early income and experience.40 The young barrister 
who serves one of his seniors as "devil" is building his reputation and 
38. Id. 
39. Flood's attitude is best illustrated by the drawing on the book's dust jacket, which depicts 
a clerk pulling the strings that control a gesticulating barrister. 
40. "Devilling" has been defined as: 
The well-established custom at the English Bar . . . of obtaining assistance from another 
barrister in drafting and researching the relevant tract of law, in which case the barrister 
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income without the clerk's intercession. Further, favorable impres-
sions formed during a young barrister's pupilage may help secure his 
or her position with senior barristers and limit the scope of the clerk's 
authority.41 Finally, as much as one-half the legal work handled by 
barristers is paid for by the government rather than private parties.42 
In cases involving government payments work is garnered and fees 
fixed with very little intercession by the clerk. These considerations do 
not demonstrate that clerks have no power over young barristers but 
do suggest that there are significant limits on the clerks' power, espe-
cially when senior barristers choose to exercise countervailing 
authority. 
Accepting the myth of mastery not only leads to inaccuracy about 
the clerks' power but to the exceptionable conclusion that clerks are 
responsible for much of the prejudicial behavior encountered by wo-
men and members of minority groups who seek to practice law. An 
analysis less committed to the proposition of clerk control would have 
been more likely to pursue the observed coincidence between barris-
ters' and clerks' biases (p. 132). Apropos of this observation it may be 
said of prejudice, as of so much else affecting the Bar, that the clerks 
are used by senior barristers to handle their "dirty work." Thus, it 
would seem more fair to blame the Bar for prejudice than to hold the 
clerks responsible. 
Flood's preoccupation with the clerks causes other problems as 
well. It deprives him of information essential to a full understanding 
of the clerks' place in the legal system. Flood so closely identifies with 
his subjects that he sees barristers as menacing adversaries43 and 
makes little effort to talk to members of the Bar for fear that his clerk 
friends will think he has been "contaminated" by such contacts (p. 
136). The absence of barristers' opinions robs Barristers' Clerks of a 
valuable perspective. It leads Flood to lend excessive credence to the 
clerks' assertions about their authority. 
Flood's allegiance to the clerks also distorts his perception of the 
part solicitors play in the legal process. He accepts the clerks' view 
that they themselves are the business getters responsible for the flow of 
cases into chambers. A careful examination of solicitors' opinions 
might have undermined this view. Flood admits that it is hard to mea-
instructed remains responsible for the work done. A barrister who employs a devil must pay 
adequate and reasonable remuneration for the work actually done. 
OXFORD CoMPANION TO THE LAW 354 (D. Walker ed. 1980). Devilling is permissible in a 
variety of settings, see W. BOULTON, supra note 12, at 27-29, and is an especially important 
source of work for young barristers. See B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, supra note 12, at 109. 
41. See R. MEGARRY, supra note 18, at 35-36. 
42. See note 28 supra; Hazell, supra note 10, at 109 (with the advent of government financ-
ing, the fee negotiating function of the clerk has declined in importance), 
43. Flood seldom refers to conversations with barristers. The lengthiest reference of this sort 
involves a remarkably unpleasant cross-examination. In this hostile exchange the barrister is 
depicted as a threatening inquisitor suspicious of Flood's work. See pp. 147-48. 
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sure the efficacy of clerks' activities in generating business (p. 24), and 
that overt touting has declined in recent years (p. 74). He clings, how-
ever, to the conviction that clerks are vital to the development of busi-
ness. This view discounts solicitor loyalty to certain chambers or 
barristers and fails to consider solicitors' views on the ways they ap-
proach the problem of selecting counsel. A careful examination of so-
licitors' opinions rather than an acceptance of the clerks' position 
might have shed more light on the question. 
Finally, although most of Barristers' Clerks is written in a clear 
and accessible style, the jargon of an ethnographic study sometimes 
creeps in to mar the quality of the presentation. Phrases from the soci-
ological literature like "cooled out"44 intrude into the text without ad-
equate definition. Although most such phrases are eventually 
explained, the reader may be kept in the dark for many pages. Simi-
larly annoying is Flood's tendency in the "Conclusion" sections of sev-
eral of his chapters to superimpose a sociological interpretation on his 
materials when that interpretation is either unsupported by the pre-
ceding text or is only tenuously tied to what has come before. 
IV. THE ISOLATION OF THE ENGLISH BAR 
One of Flood's most important conclusions is that "[t]he Bar 
maintains clean hands while the clerks do its dirty work" (p. 133). 
This pattern is reflected in the solicitation of business, the manage-
ment of young barristers, and the processing of cases. It has the most 
serious implications for the English legal profession because it means 
that at almost every turn barristers segregate themselves from contact 
with the world around them. They seldom deal directly with clients, 
solicitors or court officials; the members of each of these groups are 
held at arm's length or dealt with by the clerks. Clients have virtually 
no means of influencing their barristers' behavior. Indeed, lay clients 
can only obtain a barrister's assistance through the intercession of a 
solicitor. Economic leverage is nonexistent45 and there are virtually 
no legal remedies for the dissatisfied.46 Solicitors are also kept at a 
distance. Much of the communication between barristers and solici-
tors is handled through written instructions.47 Seldom is there any 
44. ''Those [young clerks] who are not prepared to wait ..• can be 'cooled out' with little 
regard for their feelings." P. 27. 
45. See text at notes 16-17 supra. 
46. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text. 
47. Benjamin Kaplan neatly described the process of communication between barrister and 
solicitor: 
In a case of consequence, the solicitor will have retained a barrister to settle the pleadings. 
When the case has been set down for trial, or perhaps earlier, the advice of a barrister is 
sought "on the evidence": he is handed a bundle consisting of witnesses' statements and 
other material assembled by the solicitor, with perhaps some commentary subjoined. The 
barrister is to advise how the case can be strengthened for trial; he may suggest that further 
questions be put to witnesses or that the theory of claim or defense be shifted, which may 
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sustained dialogue, and on the crucial question of fees no communica-
tion whatsoever is permitted. Nor do barristers have any contact with 
court administrators. All dealings concerning the processing of cases 
are handled by the clerks (pp. 85-96). The barristers' isolation is ac-
centuated by their unique style of dress, mode of speech and general 
demeanor in the courtroom. 48 
Senior barristers' relations with their younger colleagues reflect a 
similar pattern. Unless older advocates are interested in exploiting the 
services of juniors in circumstances like devilling, the young are likely 
to be kept at a distance. Young barristers' careers are managed by 
clerks who serve as the chief target of criticism if anything goes wrong. 
The clerks do the disagreeable jobs of removing unsuccessful candi-
dates and placating less successful practitioners. The senior members 
of chambers are seldom required to attend to these problems. The 
system assures that senior barristers will not have to assume any re-
sponsibility for the development of their juniors unless they choose to 
do so. 
The cost of such isolation is considerable. England, like the 
United States, relies on the adversary process. One of the premises of 
this process is that litigants control their cases.49 Litigant control has a 
variety of advantages, including enhanced prospects of litigant satis-
faction, 50 increased likelihood that the courts will identify and decide 
the questions the litigants see as fundamental51 and improved pros-
pects that counsel will zealously represent each client's interests.52 
The isolation of barristers vitiates these advantages. Satisfaction is not 
likely to be enhanced when the parties are removed from the manage-
ment of their cases. Similarly, responsiveness to the fundamental con-' 
call for investigation on a new line with possible amendment of the pleadings. Finally, the 
barrister receives the brief for trial. The bundle of papers now reappears, perhaps enlarged 
and improved. Besides poring over this material, the barrister will probably interview the 
lay client and any experts appearing on his side; according to protocol he will not see them 
alone but in the solicitor's presence. But the understood professional canon prohibits him 
ordinarily from seeing the other witnesses whom he will be calling to give evidence. And he 
will usually have no pretrial recourse, even secondhand through his instructing solicitor, to 
the witnesses who will be called on the other side; he may indeed be ignorant of their 
identity. 
Kaplan, An American Lawyer in the Queen's Courts: Impressions of English Civil Procedure, 69 
MICH. L. REV. 821, 831 (1971). 
48. See Hazell, Preface, THE BAR ON 1'RIAL, supra note 10, at 12; see also R. MEGARRY, 
supra note 18, at 14 ("Clients rarely get close enough to [a barrister's] shoulder to weep upon 
it ...• "). 
49. See Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric of Swift and 
Certain Justice has Affected Adjudication in American Courts, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 487, 52S 
(1980). 
50. See J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
77-80 (1975); Adams, Towards a Mobilization of the Adversary Process, 12 OsooooE HALL L. J. 
569, S16 (1974). 
51. See Adams, supra note SO, at S76-77; Lea & Walker, Efficient Procedure, 51 N.C. L. 
REV. 361, 376 (1979). 
52. See D. MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 270-74 (1973). 
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cerns of litigants is likely to be impaired when trial counsel avoid 
contacts with clients that facilitate the identification of such concerns. 
In 1821, Lord Brougham was engaged to defend Queen Caroline in 
a case charging her with adultery. During that proceeding Brougham 
had occasion to articulate what he though to be the standard of repre-
sentation required in an adversary proceeding. He said: 
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all 
the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means 
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, 
amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing 
this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction 
which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from 
that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though it 
should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion. 53 
It is significant that Brougham's statement was never endorsed by the 
English Bar.54 Its view seems to be a cooler one stressing the separa-
tion of counsel from client rather than their identity.55 The absence of 
zealous commitment to each client increases the prospect that counsel 
will give his or her first allegiance to the court. This in turn may pro-
duce a system more concerned with society's generalized interests than 
with each individual's claims. 56 
Isolation also has an effect on the quality of the work performed by 
barristers. Because barristers have little intimate contact with clients, 
it is unlikely that they will form a passionate attachment to any cli-
ent's cause. The absence of intense commitment increases the likeli-
hood of late withdrawal from representation. The frequency with 
which briefs are returned underscores the barristers' lack of attach-
53. 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (1821), quoted in D. MELLINKOFF, supra note 52, at 189. 
54. See D. MELLINKOFF, supra note·52, at 189, 272-73. I do not mean to suggest that Lord 
Brougham's view is universally accepted in America, however. The quoted passage has influen-
tial detractors. See, e.g., Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 
1031, 1036 (1975). 
55. See, e.g., W. BOULTON, supra note 12, at 70-78. 
56. In Rondel v. W., [1966] 3 All E.R. 657, 665 (C.A. 1966), ajfd. sub nom. Ronde! v. 
Worsley, [1967] 3 All E.R. 993 (H.L. 1967), Lord Denning emphasized the barrister's allegiance 
to the court: 
He has a duty to the court which is paramount. It is a mistake to suppose that he is the 
mouthpiece of his client to.say what he wants: or his tool to do what he directs. He is none 
of these things. He owes allegiance to a higher cause. It is the cause of truth and justice. 
He must not consciously mis-state the facts. He must not knowingly conceal the truth. He 
must not unjustly make a charge of fraud, that is, without evidence to support it. He must 
produce all the relevant authorities, even those that are against him. He must see that his 
client discloses, if ordered, the relevant documents, even those that are fatal to his case. He 
must disregard the most specific instructions of his client, if they conflict with his duty to the 
court. The code which requires a barrister to do all this is not a code oflaw. It is a code of 
honour. Ifhe breaks it, he is offending against the rules of the profession and is subject to its 
discipline • • . . 
See also Rondel v. Worsley, [1967] 3 All E.R. 993, 998-99 (H.L. 1967) (Lord Reid stressing duty 
of barristers to courts); R. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 454. 
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ment57 and often results in the handling of cases by barristers who 
have had extremely little time to prepare. Not only does the quality of 
representation suffer in these circumstances but the value of each case 
is diminished in the barristers' eyes. As Flood observes, the return of 
briefs "dehumanise[s] the clients' cases" (p. 72). 
Isolation fosters stagnation within the Bar. New ideas and meth-
ods are fenced out. Judgments are likely to be based on long-lived 
traditions preserved by barristers insulated from change. The conser-
vatism of the Bar can be a valuable asset, especially when it works to 
preserve institutions vital to the defense of citizens' rights. 58 It can, 
however, prove disastrous when it operates to preserve antiquated 
practices of value to no one but the Bar. An unfortunately large part 
of the activity of the English Bar has been devoted to the defense of 
arcana. 59 Reform has been painfully slow and old methods have been 
preserved long beyond the time of their utility. 
Connected with the Bar's conservatism is its tendency to perpetu-
ate a number of misleading myths about itself. These myths make a 
penetrating analysis of present conditions exceedingly difficult. One 
among many such myths is the cab-rank rule. The first-come-first-
served principle has been relied upon as one of the chief justifications 
for the barristers' rights to exclusive audience before the high courts 
and freedom from liability for malpractice. 60 Yet as Flood convinc-
ingly demonstrates, the cab-rank rule is no longer operative. In light 
of this finding, questions should be raised about the continuing propri-
ety of exclusive audience and freedom from malpractice liability. 
These questions, however, have not been raised within the Bar. 
Finally, isolation tends to institutionalize prejudice against those 
who traditionally have been excluded from the Bar. There is clear evi-
dence that both women and ethnic minorities have been discriminated 
against in their efforts to become barristers.61 Unfortunately, the 
structure of the English legal system has deflected much of the criti-
cism about prejudice from barristers to their clerks. This has insulated 
57. See text following note 29 supra. The practice of returning briefs is specifically recog-
nized in the barristers' rules of etiquette. See W. BOULTON, supra note 12, at 21 ("Briefs are as a 
rule delivered and accepted on the understanding that it is possible that a counsel may be pre• 
vented from attending the case."). Both critics of and apologists for the English Bar have, how-
ever, sharply criticized the frequency of returns. See R. MEGARRY, supra note 18, at 77-78 
(return of briefs imposes serious burdens on clients and can influence quality of advocacy); M. 
Zander, supra note 4, at 184-87 (finding poor preparation in a very high proportion of criminal 
cases in part because of late return of briefs). 
58. See Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST. 
L. J. 713, 739 (1983). 
59. See B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, LAWYERS AND THE COURTS 79-110 (1967); R. 
CocKS, supra note 36, at 85-102. 
60. See note 32 supra. 
61. See M. ZANDER, supra note 24, at 88 (women barristers earn less than their male coun• 
terparts at every level of practice); Kennedy, Women at the Bar, in THE BAR ON TRIAL, supra 
note 10, at 150-S6. 
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the Bar from pressure to make meaningful change. While the Ameri-
can Bar has not been a paragon of equal opportunity,62 it has proved 
amenable to pressure for social change. The same cannot be said of 
the English Bar. Its aloofness has fostered continuing discrimination. 
Readers should not go to Barristers' Clerks in the hope of finding a 
general exposition of English legal practice. Rather, what it provides 
is a detailed analysis of a small community within the English system. 
Careful scrutiny of that community reveals a- great deal about the way 
English advocates go about their job. It also supplies us with fresh 
insights into why barristers act the way they do. Such information is a 
valuable resource, because it helps us to understand the system better 
and because it provides us a basis upon which to fashion intelligent 
criticisms of existing attitudes and structures. 
62. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984); see generally J. AUERBACH, 
UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976). 
